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This report is part of the project ‘The 
Regulation of Palestinian Everyday Life’, 
a collaboration between LSE and Birzeit 
University. It inquires into the changing 
modes of governance impacting upon 
Palestinians in the West Bank includ-
ing East Jerusalem, their reaction and 
engagement with these systems, and the 
social effects of these engagements. The 
research investigates regulatory frame-
works and how they affect the everyday 
lives of Palestinians living under the gov-
ernance of the Palestinian Authority and 
Israeli occupation. Specific case studies 
addressed include the impact of colonial 
and neoliberal regulatory frameworks on 
farmers in their everyday life; the process 
of family reunification and ‘illegal’ sta-
tuses; and the specific situation of 
Palestinians who hold the ‘Jerusalem ID’. 
The report describes the features of these 
frameworks and the areas of everyday 
life that they influence. To engage with 
the research questions concerning how 
people experience and live these regula-
tory frameworks, the authors focus on the 
latter’s meanings and actions rather than 
their consequences alone.
Haneen Naamneh, Reem al-Botmeh and Rami Salameh 5 
Introduction
In the occupied Palestinian territories – the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem 
– the last two decades have seen the formation of new Palestinian state structures along-
side other forms of military and civil governance arising from the Israeli occupation. The 
Palestinian (proto-) citizenry has witnessed a significant transformation in the regulation 
and management of its everyday life. This regulation is sociologically important and has 
received relatively little attention in the academic literature. It presents a novel site for 
investigation, further complicated by the multiple regulatory layers – local, regional and 
international – that impinge upon and shape the lives of Palestinians living under occupa-
tion. The shift from direct occupation to ‘state-building’ subjected Palestinian society to a 
compounded set of regulatory systems that are transforming and redefining the meaning 
of Palestinian lives. 
Everyday life, seen as an arena subject to various political, socio-economic and private 
factors, is a site for multiple systems of governance that are both complementary and 
contested. ‘The everyday’ has recently become the focus of academic research from a 
wide range of disciplines beyond anthropology; these include sociology, philosophy, 
politics, law and economics. However, everyday life remains a complex concept, and dif-
ficult to coherently define. Its contours can be so vast as to embody almost everything, or 
rather specific aspects of everything related to human individual and social life. Thus, the 
everyday is not always obvious and explicit, as it might first appear. It is also a space of 
alienation, a space of social and legal communication and confrontation, a hidden place, a 
pretension, and an indirect expression of needs, emotions, ideologies and flows, including 
those of capital.
One complex aspect of everyday life arises from the trialectical relation between regula-
tions (the systems, whatever they might be), the regulators (humans or materials) and 
human practices. Thus, the everyday life in this relation of social interactions is embodied 
in human practices that are both inside and outside of any regulatory framework. In the 
Palestinian context, the dual authority under which Palestinians live, namely the Pales-
tinian Authority (PA) and the state of Israel, as well as regulation inherited from previous 
administrations that ruled Palestine, including Britain (1917–48) and Jordan and Egypt 
(1948–67), have each generated multiple legal systems that manage different but often 
intersecting aspects of Palestinians’ lives.
These include Palestinian and Israeli civil, religious and military legal systems, some of 
which arose in different historical contexts but all of which play a role in shaping the 
current conditions of authority under occupation. In governing the daily lives of Palestin-
ians, the Palestinian Authority’s governmental bodies have also developed in ways that are 
partly independent and partly dependent on Israeli military and civil bureaucratic admin-
istration. The governance and regulatory frameworks of international bodies, including 
the United Nations and its agencies (such as UNWRA or UNDP), are also significant in 
Palestinian society. In addition, non-state actors, including national and international 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), have also developed strong and growing regu-
latory aspects, adding a further global dimension to the regulation of Palestinian society.
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Following the second Intifada and the construction of the so-called ‘separation wall’ in 
the early 2000s, Israel forcefully materialised the separation between the West Bank, 
East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and enforced physical and legal distinctions between 
them. This led to divergent regulatory effects, dependent on variables such as different 
IDs, including the ‘Jerusalem ID’,1 and different locations (the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, 
Jerusalem and so on). The political implications of such administrative and material dis-
tinctions not only affected Palestinian society’s political and social engagement, but also 
the way each group subjected to these separations perceived and negotiated legality.
Existing (mostly non-academic) studies2 on regulatory frameworks and the governance 
of everyday life in the Palestinian context have been mostly focused on legalist perspec-
tives, specifically the technicalities of the law, and its role as an institutionalised doctrine. 
Furthermore, legal research has not adequately linked local regulatory frameworks with 
wider ideological constellations, especially the predominance of neoliberal ideological 
approaches in economic and political spheres. Most significantly, the ways in which Pales-
tinians from different groups and geographical areas negotiate these multi-layered (often 
contested, sometimes instrumentally used) technologies of normative governance remain 
seriously under-examined and inadequately understood in the scholarly literature.
Researching ‘The Regulation of Palestinian Everyday Life’
This research project, ‘The Regulation of Palestinian Everyday Life’, was funded by the LSE 
Middle East Centre’s Academic Collaboration with Arab Universities Programme. Professor 
Chetan Bhatt and Haneen Naamneh at LSE worked in collaboration with Dr Mudar Kassis, 
Rami Salameh and Reem al-Botmeh at Birzeit University. The project’s objectives were to 
inquire into the changing modes of governance impacting upon Palestinians, their reac-
tion and engagement with these systems, and the social effects of these engagements. The 
research investigated regulatory frameworks and how they impact upon the everyday lives 
of Palestinians under conditions of ‘dual authority’ and occupation.
Research Questions
The research project was based on a set of key questions including:
• How do regulatory frameworks shape the lives of, and enable or constrain, Palestin-
ians at particular sites of encounter?
• What kinds of Palestinian lifeworlds emerge out of different regulatory frameworks? 
• How are hierarchies of power and domination produced and distributed within life-
worlds that are dominated by regulation, control and perpetual uncertainty?
1  In 1967 Israel annexed East Jerusalem, rendering large areas of occupied Jerusalem a part of its civic 
jurisdiction, unlike the rest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in which it applied military rule. It also 
applied the legal status of ‘permanent residents’ to Jerusalemite Palestinians, commonly called a ‘Jeru-
salem ID’.
2  Such as the reports and newsletters produced by local and international NGOs, including UN agencies 
and human rights, humanitarian and legal aid organisations.
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• How are these multi-layered regulatory frameworks perceived by Palestinians? What 
are the discourses developed and deployed by Palestinians in engaging, negotiating 
and contesting these frameworks?
• How do Palestinians resist and negotiate contested knowledge and truths constructed 
through a variety of regulatory forms and technologies?
• How do neoliberal modes of governance shape and influence the way these regulatory 
frameworks operate, the modes of subjectivity they assume, and methods of encoun-
ter they establish?
Methodology and Fieldwork
The fieldwork was undertaken between May and October 2017 by a group of 16 graduate 
students3 at Birzeit University who conducted 47 interviews in total. The research project 
adopted a qualitative approach which aimed to provide a sociologically rich description of 
Palestinians’ roles as actors negotiating living law. In-depth interviews focused on the fol-
lowing main regulatory sites and institutions: legal status; checkpoints and border crossings; 
education; housing; agriculture; infrastructure and service provision, including electricity 
and water supplies; health; and employment.
Interviews covered the regulatory frameworks mentioned above through an initial sample 
that included the following sampling categories: a student in higher education; a recent 
mother; an engaged couple; a married couple in which the partners each had a different 
legal status; an elderly couple living in a remote area; and a young farmer. The factors that 
determined this sample ensured a diverse group based on demographic categories of age, 
gender, social class, level of education, employment, profession and civic status. 
The sampling criteria for selecting interviewees distinguished itself from other geogra-
phy-based research projects, as it did not adopt a geographical allocation. The researchers 
in the field started by identifying a group of Palestinians without initial consideration of 
their geographical location, whether this was in East Jerusalem, Gaza, the West Bank or 
within Israel. Instead, the research followed the ordinary pathways of selected interviewees 
and those of their friends, partners and members of their family as they navigated complex 
regulatory frameworks across different geographical areas. Following the interviews with 
this initial group, the students deployed a snowballing technique to broaden the pool 
of interviewees. Interviews took place in different localities in the West Bank, including 
Nablus, Jericho, Jenin, Ramallah, Birzeit, Hebron, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and the vil-
lages of Qabaln and Beitin.
A discourse analysis of the interviews was used to track perception of legalities among the 
interviewees and patterns of engagement and resistance to regulatory frameworks. The Pal-
3  The students who conducted the fieldwork were Alaa Abed, Maha Abualia, Anwar Abu Adas, Muath 
Al-Tallaa, Ohood Ashour, Anas Aslbakhi, Anan Atteereh, Fatima Hammad, Aseel Ibrahim, Mahed 
Jamhour, Natalie Kasabri, Hazem Mizyed, Mohammad Obaid, Walid Sabaana, Nourah Sammar and 
Nadia Tadros. The research team would like to thank the students for their efforts and investment in 
the project.
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estinian and Israeli jurisdictions have produced a different sense of, and engagement with, 
legality among Palestinians based on different legal statuses, especially IDs. In our analysis, 
we recognised the existence of these legal statuses while being acutely aware of the ethical 
implications and challenges that legal distinctions between Palestinian and Israeli jurisdic-
tions impose, as well as their effects as tools of colonial administration. The different IDs 
and their associated legal statuses constitute a primary framework that regulates Palestinian 
lives. We therefore took these IDs as the ground upon which people stand when engaging 
with legality in their everyday lives.
To allow a better understanding of these regulatory frameworks, we divided the report into 
four sections. The first addresses the broader context of the research; the second engages 
with the everyday life of farmers; the third focuses on reunification and ‘illegal’ statuses; and 
the fourth follows a group of interviewees who hold the Jerusalem ID. In each section, we 
describe the features of these regulatory frameworks and the areas of everyday life that they 
influence. To engage with how people experience and live these regulatory frameworks, we 
focused on the latter’s meanings and actions rather than their consequences alone.
The Broader Context of the Research
The West Bank came under Israeli rule after the 1967 war, during which, according to inter-
national law and UN Resolution 242, a new spatial terminology was created: ‘the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories of 1967’ (OPT), which included the West Bank, East Jerusalem and 
the Gaza Strip. As a result of the war, a new wave of refugees escaped to neighbouring coun-
tries and more than one million Palestinians fell under Israeli rule. Since 1967, Israel has 
established a network of roads to connect the Occupied Territories with Israel and incor-
porate the area’s economic activity into its own economy. At the same time, Israel has not 
incorporated the Palestinians living in the OPT through granting them Israeli citizenship.
Israel has also enforced separation policies during the last two decades, particularly after 
the first Intifada in 1987 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, and consequently 
Palestinians have been forced to live in an isolated and fragmented space. This reality has 
created new living conditions for Palestinians; the realm of everyday life has shifted into 
a different jurisdiction, one characterised by dispossession, uncertainty and vulnerability.
The signing of the Oslo Accords between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) 
and Israel resulted in the establishment of the Palestinian Authority as a governing body 
with a state-like apparatus.4 The PA was established with a governmental jurisdiction (civil 
affairs and policing) over the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, but 
4  The Oslo Accords refer to a set of agreements, notes, memorandums, annexes and protocols between 
the Israeli government and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). The Accords represent the 
start of a peace process that was supposed to lead to a Palestinian state in the Palestinian territories 
occupied by Israel in 1967. For an overall understanding of the Oslo framework see: Geoffrey R. Watson, 
The Oslo Accords: International Law and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreements (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2000); and Raja Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords: Israel and the Palestinian 
Territories Vol. 4. (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
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without sovereignty over the land, water and borders. The Oslo Accords included arrange-
ments on the transfer of certain powers from the Israeli military authorities and its civil 
administration to the PA. The responsibility for the health, education, taxation, municipal 
services and internal security of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza was transferred 
to the PA. However, the Israeli authorities maintained control over security, land, borders, 
water, natural resources, the registration of the population, all movement in and out of the 
Territories and movement between cities and villages. The Territories were divided into 
three areas: A, B and C. The Accords confined the PA to having limited powers in areas A 
and B, related to civil and local matters affecting the population.
The PA’s powers were not only limited, but also attached to a system of territorial, per-
sonal and legal jurisdiction that gave Israel ultimate control over the Palestinian population. 
In addition, the occupation maintained its system of military courts and military orders 
which continue to directly subject the Palestinian civilian population to the control of 
Israeli military institutions. Furthermore, the Oslo systems of jurisdiction were combined 
with a greatly intensified system of control utilised by the occupation. This includes, on 
one hand, physical measures of violence directed towards Palestinians, construction and 
expansion of Israeli settlements over Palestinian land, the building of the ‘separation wall’5 
and checkpoints and blockades at pass roads. On the other hand, it also includes arbitrary 
and discriminatory regulatory techniques as well as legal bureaucratic measures related to 
permits, residency, zoning and planning regulations.6
After twenty-five years, the Oslo Accords contributed to the consolidation of colonial 
occupation and the establishment of a neoliberal economy which has brought far-reaching 
structural changes to Palestinian politics and society.7 The Accords facilitated the emer-
gence of a set of institutions and actors within Palestinian society, each associated with the 
state-building project and its neoliberal economic logic.8 The outcomes of these processes 
included: the growth of a politically influential business sector, the PA’s increased reliance 
on a loan and debt economy, the emergence of competitive individualism, the bureaucra-
tisation of local politics, the enlargement of the middle class, and a weakened and more 
vulnerable Palestinian working class and rural economy.9
5  See also International Court of Justice, ‘Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice - Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory’, 9 July 2004, paras 
111–13.
6  See United Nations General Assembly, ‘Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices 
Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories’, UN 
DOC A/71/352 (2016); and Richard Falk, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967’, UN Doc. A/HRC/25/67/331 13 (2014).
7  Jamil Hilal, ‘Rethinking Palestine: Settler-colonialism, neo-liberalism and individualism in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip’, Contemporary Arab Affairs 8/3 (2015): pp. 351–62.
8  Ibid.
9  Tariq Dana, ‘The Palestinian Capitalists That Have Gone Too Far’, Al-Shabaka: The Palestinian Policy 
Network – January Policy Brief (2014).
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Living as Farmers: Occupation and Neoliberalism in Everyday Life
In this section we aim to present a general overview on how different powers are regulating 
Palestinian everyday life, whether this regulation is implemented by Israeli law and eco-
nomic policies, by the PA and its neoliberal ordering of Palestinian social and economic 
life, or by international humanitarian and donor agencies. Although this section focuses on 
Palestinian farmers and their everyday life, the regulation of everyday life in Palestine is is 
not merely a sectorial nor spatial issue: the everyday life of a farmer living in Burin village in 
the north of Nablus, for instance, is affected by the same policies as those who are living in 
the city of Ramallah or Jerusalem, though this may be at a different level. Different concepts 
and meanings that emerged from the interview data – such as dispossession, uncertainty, 
general exploitation and vulnerability – indicate the characteristics of everyday life in Pal-
estine. 
The overall changes in the political, social and economic horizons of Palestinian society 
since the Oslo Accords also resulted in fundamental changes in people’s perspectives 
regarding their future, including in the farming sector. For example, a 50-year-old male 
farmer living in Burin village hoped that his son would get a university degree and work in a 
bank, rather than follow in his footsteps. This was a prominent theme in our interviews and 
denoted a change in perspective from a society that used to value farming and agriculture as 
vital industries, to one that sees farming as an economic burden and the private and service 
sectors as the economy’s lifelines.
These changes in perceptions result from the myriad obstacles that farmers encounter, 
including exploitive economies and lack of access to land and other essential resources. 
These factors were well illustrated in a 2018 film, Bloody Basil, produced by the Palestinian 
research centre, Al-Marsad,10 which documented the everyday lives of Palestinian women 
farmers in the Jordan Valley, highlighting the exploitative settler-colonial economic system 
to which they are subjected. Additionally, the absence of the PA in offering any support to 
marginalised communities results in these farmers being exploited by Palestinian subcon-
tractors.
Difficulties for Palestinian farmers are particularly exacerbated by their inability to access 
their land. Since the 1967 occupation, and in a process that intensified after the Oslo Accords, 
Israel has built over 200 settlements on occupied land. Most of the settlements surround 
Palestinian cities and villages and have produced a new spatiality and lived realities for West 
Bank farmers. Furthermore, settlements are mostly built on top of hills meaning that the 
majority of cultivable land is in their vicinity, further exposing the farmers and the land itself 
to systematic settler violence and sabotage. 
The same interviewee from the village of Burin described his daily attempts to access his 
land as being like the movements of a ‘thief ’: ‘I reach my lands as a thief, as someone that 
10  Al-Marsad (The Social and Economic Policies Monitor) is a Palestinian research institution special-
ised in the study, analysis and critique of social and economic policies in Palestine and the Arab region. 
The film was the first of its kind to shed light on the lived reality of Palestinian women farmers in the 
Jordan Valley.
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does not want anyone to catch him … I go farming as if I have a hundred eyes’. Inaccessibil-
ity of farming land is further aggravated by the Israeli permit regime imposed on farmers, 
whereby they are required to obtain permits to be able to cultivate their land if it is located 
near settlements.
Furthermore, Israel has transformed the Palestinian economy into a captive market for 
Israeli producers,11 while also having transformed the Palestinian labour market into one 
dominated by unskilled workers. This started between 1974 and 1992, by which point labour 
migrants going to Israel represented over a third of the Palestinian employed workforce, 
generating more than a quarter of the GNP of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.12 Capturing the 
market and controlling Palestinian economic activity has forced many Palestinian farmers 
to abandon their land and work as unskilled workers in settlements or inside Israel proper. 
According to interviewees across different villages in the West Bank, few people have 
remained farmers. In Burin, with a population of over 3,000, there are only three farmers 
left. In several interviews, Palestinian farmers referred to agriculture as a dying industry in 
Palestine. However, the reasons for the decline, as farmers have pointed out, is not solely 
because of the modalities of colonial control but also due to the lack of an active and 
supportive agricultural policy by the PA. The complex reality narrated in these interviews 
demonstrate the impact of different layers of regulatory frameworks on Palestinian every-
day life, as Israeli restrictions on farmers are compounded by the absence of a clear strategy 
by the PA to support agriculture.
Farmers described their relationship to the PA Ministry of Agriculture as ‘project-based’ and 
referred to the work of the PA as that of a ‘charitable organisation’. For example, instead of 
protecting farmers from settler violence, the PA distribute extinguishers so they can fight 
the fire when settlers start burning olive trees and other crops.
Active protection of farmers is also lacking within wider Palestinian society. A 50-year-old 
farmer from Jiftlik village near Nablus described to us how he was forced to change his 
crops from citrus fruits to palm, firstly because of Israeli control of the water supply, and 
secondly because of the Palestinian middleman who spiked the price of the water itself, in 
order to make a profit.
In other interviews, two middle-aged farmers from the village of Beit Dajan, near Nablus, 
said that, during the 1980s, Ein Shibly spring water used to irrigate more than 170,000 
square metres of agricultural land in both Beit Dajan and Jiftlik. However, today Ein Shibly 
produces no water. They claimed there were two reasons behind this: firstly, Israeli policies 
that control the overall water supply, and secondly, the wanton wastage of water by some 
Palestinians, which has dire consequences for the everyday life of farmers. They explained 
that the Palestinian Water Authority granted permission to a few Palestinians to drill wells 
while not limiting their daily usage. This negatively affected the water supply of Ein Shibly, 
resulting in the creation of a new monopoly over water.
11  Neve Gordon, Israel’s Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 70.
12  Leila Farsakh, Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land and Occupation (Abingdon: Rout-
ledge, 2005), p. 1.
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The monopolisation of Palestinian public resources and the transformation of society into 
one beholden to financial regulations and institutions have been key consequences of the 
post-Oslo period. The Accords had long-lasting effects on Palestinian everyday life, in par-
ticular through a new set of neoliberal regulations that have intensified since 2006 and are 
characterised by a heavy presence of the private sector throughout society. Policies that 
result in the monopolising of Palestinian resources have fostered uncertainty, vulnerability 
and dispossession. The narrative of a middle-aged vegetable and fruit merchant in Qabatiya, 
a city in the Jenin governorate, shows that financial and banking institutions have not only 
drowned urban employees with home, car and personal loans, but that this is also true for 
farmers living in remote areas. Everyday social relations and activities revolve around the 
repayment of debt and interest to the bank:
Employees are unable to pay shop owners for their daily consumption. Consequently, 
shop owners are not able to pay their debt to the fruit and vegetable merchants, these 
merchants are not able to pay back the farmers, and the farmers are not able to pay the 
agricultural supplies store. In this situation, bank loans become the only solution.
According to this farmer, these processes have produced individuals who work solely to 
repay debts to banks and financial institutions. Moreover, the interviews also illustrated 
how the presence of financial institutions, banks and the private sector goes beyond loans, 
debts and interest. One farmer we interviewed tried to obtain a permit to work as a con-
struction worker in Israel. He was instructed by the District Coordination Office in Nablus 
to open a bank account and deposit 1,200 Israeli Shekels as a prerequisite for applying for 
the permit, and to obtain a valid mobile number. Such demands have become normalised 
in everyday life.
A Dying Agriculture
Palestinian farmers are caught within highly compounded and entangled bureaucratic 
processes that are consequences of the variety of post-Oslo coercive and regulatory polit-
ical and economic frameworks they are compelled to negotiate. We investigated how the 
occupation has created a new everyday reality for those Palestinian farmers living in the 
Occupied Territories, especially concerning land confiscations, accessibility of land, homes 
and farming resources, and the agricultural conditions that Palestinian farmers are forced 
to endure and navigate. Dispossession, exploitation and uncertainty are produced through 
regulating the everyday life of Palestinians at different levels. Our fieldwork has revealed 
that regulatory policies have been implemented at various stages and by different powers 
to control and regulate Palestinian everyday life in the Occupied Territories. These kind of 
complex relations between colonial policies and how they have been reproduced and used 
by some Palestinians should be further researched in order to develop a more nuanced and 
detailed understanding of the effects of settler colonialism, and its complex functionality 
at the micro-level.
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Reunification Procedures: Illegal Subjects in Everyday Life
This research project examined layered interactions of regulatory techniques and bureau-
cratic measures on the everyday life of Palestinians living with an ‘illegal’ status in the 
Occupied Territories. Fieldwork explored the ways in which illegality is produced in the 
context of the West Bank. Israel’s control of the West Bank’s borders means that it deter-
mines who enters and how long they may remain, in addition to who receives the status 
of ‘resident’ and who does not. It also regulates permissions granted for persons to be in 
certain areas, and has the power to render their status ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’. Israel also governs 
whether or not a person can receive residency status in the West Bank by becoming a PA 
‘citizen’ and whether they can receive a family reunification permit.
Control over the legal status of Palestinians in the West Bank is performed through an 
authority called the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories, which is sub-
ordinate to the Israeli Defence Ministry. As stipulated by the Oslo Accords, the Ministry of 
Civil Affairs was formed by the PA in 1994 to deal and liaise with Israeli authorities over all 
civil affairs, including the economy, environment, water, population and public institutions. 
‘Illegal’ residents may include Palestinians from Gaza who overstay their visit permit to the 
West Bank; Palestinian refugee families who hold Jordanian passports and entered Pales-
tine through a visitor permit, while remaining in the West Bank with the aim of obtaining 
residency status; and persons who were children when their parents overstayed their visit 
permit and grew up before their parents got approval for reunification.
Family reunification cases fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. 
Permits and reunification requests are initially processed by the Ministry, which then sends 
these requests to the Israeli authorities and relays to the Palestinian individual the results 
of their applications. Reunification processes apply differently depending on one’s place of 
residence, namely whether they live in Israel, Jerusalem, the West Bank or Gaza.  Each ‘legal’ 
group has its own procedures and relevant regulatory frameworks, and there are different 
institutions that process requests for these categories. These categories have to be under-
stood in a context where, for residents of the West Bank, forms of legal status are always 
shifting and contingent upon the changing policies of Israel.13 Our focus in this section will 
be on individuals who are considered ‘illegal residents’ of the West Bank by Israel’s regula-
tory framework, while the section that follows will discuss the case of Palestinian residents 
of Jerusalem.
Family reunification procedures historically arose from mechanisms that were designed to 
deprive the Palestinian refugees of 1948 and 1967 of their right to return to their homes.14 As 
such, while these procedures appear to be the only method to afford some Palestinians the 
possibility of return, they are also used as a technique of displacement that strips Palestin-
13  Tobias Kelly, ‘Returning home? Law, Violence, and Displacement among West Bank Palestinians’, 
PoLAR - Political and Legal Anthropology Review 27/2 (2004): pp. 95–112.
14  Nabila El-Ahmed and Nadia Abu-Zahra, ‘Unfulfilled Promise: Palestinian Family Reunification and the 
Right of Return’, Journal of Palestine Studies 45/3 (2016).
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ians of their right to return as a birthright. Rather, this technique considers their cases on 
purely humanitarian grounds.15 The result of a successful application for reunification is the 
granting of the status of ‘legal resident of the West Bank’. The documents associated with 
obtaining a legal status are central to the everyday life of Palestinians. They determine the 
person’s relationship with the PA and the Israeli authorities. They regulate access to rights 
and redress.16 They furthermore determine a person’s ability to move around the West Bank, 
travel on specific roads, or travel between the West Bank and Gaza. 
Stories collected through the fieldwork illustrate the specifics of Palestinian lives whose 
presence in the West Bank is deemed ‘illegal’. One 21-year-old male interviewee told us 
about his father, a Palestinian refugee who used to be a teacher in Saudi Arabia, but was dis-
missed from his post in 2000. His mother was a Palestinian refugee from Gaza. His father 
had a temporary Jordanian passport and his mother used to hold an Egyptian travel doc-
ument, both of which had since expired. The family entered the West Bank with a visitor 
permit, overstayed, and has since been living with no legal documents.
Another male interviewee in his 20s came to Hebron from Jordan as a young child in 1997 
with his mother and siblings on a visit permit. The family overstayed the term of the permit 
and then started a reunification procedure. The reunification was rejected in 1999, although 
the Israeli authorities approved a number of other cases at the time. After 2002, the author-
ities stopped processing reunification requests. However, in 2008 a group of reunification 
approvals were issued again and the family finally got approval for their eleven-year old 
request. However, the male interviewee explained that: ‘although I had the same status and 
documents and went through the same process [as the mother and his siblings] all got it 
[except him]’.
The reunification procedures are designed to deny the right of Palestinians to return to their 
homeland and instead make reunification contingent on ‘humanitarian’ grounds. However, 
people caught in this procedure do not consider it a way to attain citizenship, but rather as 
a process for getting ID documents to facilitate everyday life. For them, they are already citi-
zens. For example, one interviewee wanted the documents as proof of his citizenship: ‘Now 
we live in the West Bank without any official papers or any documents [serving as] proof 
that we are citizens’. For another interviewee, the reunification procedure was not to estab-
lish his Palestinian identity but rather to facilitate his everyday life: ‘I want an identity card 
that facilitates my movement [rather than establishes] citizenship, which I already have.’ 
However, their fear of displacement is continuous and the process of receiving residency 
status is perennially uncertain.17
Over the years, the occupation authorities have implemented reunification procedures arbi-
trarily and approved very few family reunification requests. The Oslo Accords contained 
15  Sawsan Ramahi, ‘The suffering of Palestinians seeking family reunification’, Middle East Monitor (2015).
16  Tobias Kelly, ‘Documented Lives: Fear and the uncertainties of law during the second Palestinian 
intifada’, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 12/1 (2006), pp. 89–107.
17  Ibid.
Haneen Naamneh, Reem al-Botmeh and Rami Salameh 15 
agreements over an annual quota, but by 2002 Israel had frozen reunification requests, 
only allowing for a few exceptions as a ‘political gesture’.18 The direct impact of having an 
‘illegal’ status is the lack of freedom of movement and the possibility of getting arrested at 
checkpoints. However, the process of reunification and the status of ‘illegality’ it confers 
upon Palestinians has a far-reaching impact on the everyday life of people involved within 
this process, as well as the people around them. It furthermore has a tremendous impact on 
the social and economic domain of everyday life.
For example, one interviewee had faced problems related to education and health since the 
beginning of his stay in the West Bank. He had to rely on studying in private schools and 
on private health services, since he could not use public school or health services. He also 
worried that his status would have an impact on his children’s future. Another interviewee 
faced obstacles in daily activities like attending school, as he had to be accompanied by his 
father, sibling and mother each day while testing for the official high school exams in order 
to prove that he was who he claimed to be. Also, he could not go to university as he needed 
a photo ID, a document that no agency could provide him with, including the PA.
One interviewee had to move house from Hebron to Ramallah in order to be close to the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs where he could regularly follow up on his application. This move 
took him away from his social support network. In addition, his employment was affected 
even though he worked with a foreign organisation as an international trainer. He could not 
open a bank account nor take out a loan. His fiancée explained, in a separate interview, that 
for the expenses of marriage a loan was required. As he could not do this himself, she had 
to take the loan instead. As such, his status affects her life, responsibilities and their overall 
welfare as a family. He has to rely on his fiancée to get access to services and their life has 
to be built around the fact that he does not have any relevant identity documents. Their 
marriage had to be undertaken outside the court system and their children will have to be 
registered by their mother. To get treated in a public hospital, he has to use a friend’s ID and 
insurance, thus introducing another space of ‘illegality’.
One interviewee from Gaza who resides in the West Bank is considered illegal although he 
has an ID card: his presence in the West Bank is ‘illegal’ as his ID confines his stay to Gaza. 
It is also ‘illegal’ for him to work as a doctor, although he has passed all the necessary exams 
and is qualified to practice. He explained in the interview how his status prevents him from 
having a normal family life. None of his family members can apply for a visit permit to the 
West Bank, including his wife and daughter. He lamented how difficult it is to be far away 
from his family, with their only contact being online via Facebook. His case shows how 
‘illegality’ is produced by regulatory frameworks through numerous contingent processes.19
18  Ramahi, ‘The suffering of Palestinians seeking family reunification’.
19  Kelly, ‘Documented Lives’.
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Living an ‘Illegal’ Palestinian Life
These various cases show the depth of legal exclusion to which Palestinians are subject, but 
also show how regulatory frameworks work together to produce such cases of exclusion. 
This exposes the interaction between the logic of state-building that emphasises bureau-
cracy, documents and ID, and colonial technologies of control and exclusion that depend 
on utilising such categories: citizens, residents, legal and illegal subjects. The situation was 
and remains neither a division nor a full integration; instead it structurally maintains control 
through fragmentation, domination and dispossession of Palestinians. In this context, the 
Oslo Accords and the processes associated with them have effectively consolidated and 
deepened the control of the occupation over Palestinian life, often utilising the same strate-
gic mechanisms developed by Israeli colonialism in the preceding decades.20 Furthermore, 
the Accords helped introduce and establish techniques of control and management through 
systems of jurisdiction and classification of Palestinian territory and the Palestinian popu-
lation.21
Living with a ‘Jerusalem ID’
In 1967, Israel occupied the eastern parts of Jerusalem, including the Old City and the sur-
rounding areas, which became known as ‘East Jerusalem’. Immediately after the war, the 
Israeli Knesset enacted a set of laws that declared the application of Israeli civic law on the 
eastern parts of Jerusalem,22 unlike the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories in which 
it applied military law.
This rendered large areas of occupied Jerusalem officially part of Israel, while at the same 
time conferring upon Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents the legal status of ‘permanent 
residents’. This (revocable) status defines the Palestinian community in the city as an immi-
grant community, treating its members as newcomers and dismembering23 them from their 
historical context. Furthermore, as permanent residents, this community’s right to reside in 
the city is constantly monitored and threatened through the ‘Centre of Life’ policy,24 most 
particularly in the last two decades.25
20  See Shehadeh, From Occupation to Interim Accords; Adam Hanieh, ‘The Oslo Illusion’, Jacobin 10 (2013); 
and Arie Arnon, ‘Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic Dimension, 
1967–2007’, Middle East Journal 61/4 (2007), pp. 573–95.
21  Raja Shehadeh, ‘Multiple Legal Systems in the West Bank’, Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, 
and Culture 21/3 (2016), p. 6.
22  In fact, the Knesset amended two regulations to enable the annexation of Jerusalem: (1) Law and 
Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law [1967], (2) Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment 
No. 6) Law [1967], and enacted the Protection of Holy Places Law [1967].
23  Leila Kawar, ‘Legality and (dis)membership: Removal of citizenship and the creation of “virtual immi-
grants” in the 1967 Israeli occupied territories’, Citizenship Studies 14/5 (2010), pp. 573–88.
24  This policy was dictated in the Israeli High Court of Justice ruling in the case of Mubarak ʿAwad – 
HCJ 282/88 ʿAwad v. Minister of Interior, 5 June 1988. It stipulated a number of criteria that a person has 
to meet in order to be granted permanent residency or to continue being eligible for this status if they 
already hold one.
25  Danielle Jefferis, ‘The “Center of Life” Policy: Institutionalizing Statelessness in East Jerusalem’, Jeru-
salem Quarterly 50 (2012), pp. 94–103; Usama Halabi, ‘Revoking Permanent Residency: A Legal Review 
of Israeli Policy’, Jerusalem Quarterly 9 (2000), pp. 40–7.
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The Oslo Accords considered the status of Jerusalem a political affair which would be 
resolved in the future. Therefore, Jerusalem was excluded from the territories under the 
governance of the PA, and the city’s Palestinian residents were denied membership in the 
PA’s quasi-state. In fact, this dismembering rendered the Palestinian residents of Jerusalem 
stateless subjects ‘without identity’. A male Jerusalemite law student in his 30s commented:
The Jerusalemites’… reality tells you about them. They are people with no identity, they 
are neither able to get the Palestinian identity as Palestinian citizens nor the Jordanian 
passport which is temporary. Actually, they are not citizens… Even the Jerusalem iden-
tity card does not mean that you have a citizenship. It is just a residency card and they 
[the Israeli authorities] consider you as a resident on their land, not as the owner of the 
land as a Palestinian.
The permanent residency status of Palestinian Jerusalemites is the primary regulatory 
framework that determines the lives of this community.26 Legislation and the policies that 
constitute this regulatory framework have ‘institutionalised statelessness’27 and shaped pre-
carious forms of individual and communal relations, including mobility within and outside 
Palestine, family ties, and places of residence, employment and education.28 An extensive 
body of literature has addressed the impact of the ‘Jerusalem ID’ upon the everyday life of 
Palestinians in the city, within the frameworks of settler-colonial and biopolitical regimes of 
governance and surveillance and through bureaucracy and the rule of law.29
As law becomes ever more present in the everyday life of Jerusalem ID holders, our research 
examined the perceptions and reactions of this community to concepts of legality, bureau-
cracy and (dis)order. What are the main features of the Jerusalem ID regulatory framework? 
How does the Palestinian community of Jerusalem conceive of, engage with, and live ‘legal-
ity’? Or rather, how does it experience the ‘illegality’ of being a Palestinian, giving birth or 
building a house in Jerusalem? These questions stood at the heart of the interviews held 
with thirteen residents either holding a Jerusalem ID or being directly affected by someone 
else’s.
26  In everyday conversations in Palestine, references to the Jerusalem ID or West Bank ID are very 
common. The political and legal implications of these IDs are key. Identifying what kind of ID one holds 
often determines the topic and themes of daily conversations. Helga Tawil-Souri refers to ID in the Pal-
estinian context as ‘the space in which Palestinians meet, confront, tolerate, and sometimes challenge 
the Israeli state’. See Helga Tawil-Souri, ‘Colored Identity: The Politics and Materiality of ID cards in 
Palestine/Israel’, Social Text 29/2 (2011), pp. 67–97, at p. 69.
27  Jefferis, ‘The “Center of Life” Policy’.
28  Reporting and documenting the impacts of these policies on everyday life has become a primary task 
of the local and international NGO sector in the city. Among these are several UN bodies including 
OCHA and UNRWA, in addition to the Civic Coalition for Palestinian Rights in Jerusalem, the Legal and 
Human Rights Center, Btselem and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel.
29  See for example: Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian, Security Theology, Surveillance and the Politics of Fear 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Nadera Shalhoub Kevorkian, ‘The Politics of Birth and the 
Intimacies of Violence Against Palestinian Women in Occupied East Jerusalem’, British Journal of 
Criminology 55/6 (2015), pp. 1187–206; Helga Tawil-Souri, ‘Surveillance Sublime: The Security State in 
Jerusalem’, Jerusalem Quarterly 68 (2016), pp. 56–65; Nigel Parsons and Mark B. Salter. ‘Israeli Biopolitics: 
Closure, Territorialisation, and Governmentality in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’, Geopolitics 13/4 
(2008), pp. 701–23; Elia Zuriek, ‘Constructing Palestine through Surveillance Practices’, British Journal 
of Middle Eastern Studies 28/2 (2011), pp. 205–27.
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The Jerusalem ID as a Regulatory Framework
The legal distinction between Palestinian residents of Jerusalem and those residing in other 
parts of the West Bank has intensified since the beginning in the early 2000s,30 with the 
construction of the ‘separation wall’31 and the ban on family unification processes.32 Both 
physical and legal separations led to the forcible disconnection of Jerusalem from its polit-
ical, social and economic continuity with the West Bank. 
This exclusion, governing one’s position on either side of the wall, became the dominant 
framework regulating everyday life for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. The drastic 
transformation of life in Jerusalem before and after the wall (combined with the restrictions 
implied by permanent residency status) is best illustrated through the ways in which Jeru-
salem ID holders speak about their life before the construction of the wall.
Several interviewees reflected on ‘uncalculated’33 decisions they made ‘before the wall’ or 
before the family unification (lam al-shamil) process. For couples, where one person held a 
Jerusalem ID and got married to a West Bank ID-holder, or for parents who did not register 
their children in Jerusalem before 2003, living with the results of these ‘uncalculated’ deci-
sions was a daily burden.
Interview with female Jerusalemite in her 30s, with a BA from Birzeit University:
Interviewer: Was the Palestinian identity card an obstacle for you when you got engaged 
[in 2004]? 
Interviewee: We didn’t think about it then, we just had an agreement and we were 
engaged. We had not thought that the identity card would be an obstacle… this hadn’t 
come into our minds at all.
Interviewer: When you were together at university, weren’t you worried that you were 
from Jerusalem and he was from the West Bank?
Interviewee: No, No.
30  Though the checkpoints system and permits regime started earlier, in the 1990s.
31  The separation wall doesn’t only refer to the barrier itself, but also to different types of control 
mechanism that have become part of the way the wall operates. See Merav Amir, ‘On the Border of 
Indeterminacy: The Separation Wall in East Jerusalem’, Geopolitics 16/4 (2011), pp. 768–92.
32  The Citizenship and Entry to Israel Law (Temporary Order) – 2003. This amendment prohibited 
most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza from applying for family unification with their partner, 
regardless if they held citizenhip or permanent residency, as in the case of Palestinians in Jerusalem. See 
Mazen Masri, ‘Love Suspended: Demography, Comparative Law, and Palestinian Couples in the Israeli 
Supreme Court’, Social and Legal Studies 22/3 (2013), pp. 309–34.
33  See Doaa Hammoudeh, Layaly Hamayel and Lynn Welchman, ‘Beyond the Physicality of Space: East 
Jerusalem, Kufr ‘Aqab, and the Politics of Everyday Suffering’, Jerusalem Quarterly 65 (2016), pp. 35–50, 
at p. 40.
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Interview with male Jerusalemite in his mid-20s, with a BA from Birzeit University:
Interviewer: Has your family ever explained the reasons for not registering you in order 
to get [you] the Jerusalem ID, though that was possible at the time?
Interviewee: As I told you, the situation was different then [in 2000]. From 2003 to 
2017 everything changed…everything. Even before ’92, people never thought about what 
might happen to them because there was no [Palestinian] authority…we were subjected 
to the [Israeli] civil administration. 
Living under the threatening regulatory framework of the ‘Jerusalem ID’, its holders perceive 
the legal system as a coercive authority, with the capacity and intention to revoke rights at 
any time, without granting protection or security. Interviewees holding Jerusalem IDs often 
referred to this regulatory framework as a complex system which enforces unrestrained 
authority to interfere with and control their lives, with an arbitrariness and contingency that 
renders predictability impossible.34
Engagement with the law is often described by the interviewees as involving ‘impossible 
and absurd demands’ and ‘a process of suffering’ that entails significant economic burdens. 
For some, this discourages engagement with the legal system, even when they have a poten-
tial case or legal standing in the Israeli courts. They fear the Israeli authorities may come up 
with other legal issues to use against them.
Impact on Everyday Life
The Israeli regulation of Jerusalem ID holders’ private sphere associates documentation and 
registration with the person’s very existence (in legal terms).35 People’s descriptions of their 
daily lives were marked by their awareness of the authority of documents – especially IDs – 
as well as the importance of registration. Lack of papers was equated by one interviewee with 
‘air’, non-existence and absence, regardless of whether they were referring to a registration of 
a person, a property or social ties.
Documents in the Palestinian context also represent unpredictable and unstable techniques 
of governance, due to their changing meanings and interpretations under the occupation.36 
Consequently, Jerusalem ID holders developed an awareness of their legal subjectivity as 
hazardous and vulnerable, and they demonstrated an understanding of the ‘doubling’ effects 
of identification documents which created a distance between the physical and the legal 
persona.37 Thus, developing a system of calculation could be seen as a way to bridge this dis-
tance between the physical and legal subject within the Jerusalem ID regulatory framework, 
as they carried the ‘burden of proof ’ of their legal subjectivity. In this sense, the protection 
of the ID in the long- and short-term reflected an intense presence of legality that ‘lives’ with 
the individuals on a daily basis. 
34  Ibid., pp. 43–44.
35  For further understanding of the documents as an authority in daily Palestinian life, see Kelly, ‘Docu-
mented Lives’, p. 89.
36  Ibid., pp. 89–107.
37  Ibid., pp. 90–2.
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The legal subjectivity that has evolved from within this regulatory framework is built upon 
the continuous threat of becoming illegal. Calculations must cover all aspects of life, in both 
the short- and long- term, including place of birth, residence and education, registration of 
marriage, and being at home at particular times.
As a result, Jerusalem ID holders have become diligent students of the relevant laws and 
bureaucracy, abreast of the various deadlines, relevant authorities and procedures, forms 
and legal consequences. Failure to know the law in detail threatens one’s ability to maintain 
possession of a Jerusalem ID. Interviewees indicated that the consequences of Jerusalem ID 
revocation are to live in a state of suspension and statelessness, since it is not easy to obtain 
a West Bank ID upon revocation of permanent residency status in Jerusalem.38
The intensified regulation of everyday life for Jerusalem ID holders over the last two 
decades has also created a distinction between living in Jerusalem and living as a Jerusalem 
ID holder. The resident’s relationship with the city has become determined by the Jerusa-
lem ID as a document, rather than by Jerusalem as a home city. In this sense the meaning 
of ‘living in Jerusalem’, based on the interviewees’ responses, refers to physical presence 
within the municipal border of Jerusalem. The separation wall has created liminal spaces 
that are heavily populated by Palestinian residents,39 but – while excluded from the route of 
the separation wall – remain within the municipal jurisdiction. 
These grey areas40 have become among the few accessible residential spaces for those who 
seek to protect their Jerusalem ID, by offering proof that their ‘centre of life’ is within the 
municipal border. But at the same time, given the restrictive planning regime, there is a 
severe housing shortage and many Palestinians cannot afford to live within the city’s bor-
ders.41 Many others are married to Palestinians with a West Bank ID and are unable to obtain 
a residency permit in Jerusalem. In this sense, Palestinians in these areas would be counted 
as living in Jerusalem, but are at the same time physically separated from its daily life and 
social fabric.
Under these conditions, the meaning of ‘living as a Jerusalemite’ has also been affected and 
challenged, as it reflects a form of a relationship with the city that revolves around identity 
cards, documents and legal status. The bonds of Jerusalem ID holders who live in these grey 
38  Merav Amir, ‘On the Border of Indeterminacy: The Separation Wall in East Jerusalem’, Geopolitics 16/4 
(2011), pp. 768–92, at p. 784.
39  These emerged as ‘excluded areas’ following the construction of the wall, which followed the munic-
ipal boundaries in most areas, but excluded a few areas including Kufr ʿAqab, where a large population 
of Palestinians reside. As such, the wall has operated as a demographic tool to reduce the number of 
Palestinians residing in Jerusalem: Ibid., pp. 778–9.
40  Since the construction of the wall the population of two of these areas, Shu’fat and Kufr ʿAqab, has 
increased to approximately 70–90,000, about a quarter of Jerusalem’s Palestinian population: See 
Candace Graff, ‘Pockets of Lawlessness in the “Oasis of Justice”’ Jerusalem Quarterly 58 (2014), p. 18.
41  On the illegality of house building in Jerusalem, see Irus Braverman, ‘Powers of Illegality: House Dem-
olitions and Resistance in East Jerusalem’, Law & Social Inquiry 32/2 (2007), pp. 333–72. The last two 
decades witnessed a fundamental increase of property prices in Palestinian neighbourhoods within the 
municipal borders, including in the Old City, due to increasing Israeli taxation enforcement policy and 
the high demand for housing within the wall.
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areas of the city are determined by regulations, documents and a regime of bureaucratic 
surveillance ‘built on a framework in which Palestinians are categorically suspect’,42 rather 
than a lived and practiced citizenship in Jerusalem. These categorisations have political 
consequences as they further deepen the distinctions between West Bank and Jerusalem 
ID holders, and among those of the latter based on whether they live within or without the 
confines of the wall.
Interview with female Jerusalemite in her 30s, with a BA from Birzeit University:
Interviewer: Do you think that the difference in identities have a great effect on our life? 
If we had one identity with the same privileges, would there be any difference?
Interviewee: Yes, of course. It would affect us in all fields, especially in housing. This is 
the biggest obstacle because everything has an alternative except housing. For schools 
we are allowed to have an alternative but they [the Israeli authorities] are so harsh about 
the issue of housing because they want to make us feel frustrated and desperate. If you 
think about it historically and try to ask why Kufr ʿ Aqab has become as it is now, you will 
understand that this happened because people were forced to live in Kufr ʿAqab. You 
see, housing is the main issue…it is the core of the problem. We’ve got schools, medical 
centres, everything except housing. They [the Israeli authorities] insist that if someone 
wants to get – and permanently keep – the Jerusalem ID, he has to reside in Jerusalem.
These distinctions between Jerusalem as an ID and Jerusalem as the city is illustrated in the 
interviewees’ description of the ID’s limitations on the place of residence as being the most 
coercive feature of the Jerusalem ID regulatory framework. Deprivation from the freedom 
to choose a place of residence is exacerbated by a monitoring system, or ‘matrix of sur-
veillance’ involving several Israeli authorities43 and tools,44 which interfere in the everyday 
private life of Jerusalem ID holders.45
Interview with female Jerusalemite in her 30s, with a BA from Birzeit University:
Interviewee: They [the Israeli authorities] came and checked if I live in the house.
Interviewer: You mean that they were checking to make sure that you really lived there?
Interviewee: Yes, in surprise visits without any [advance] notice. They just come, knock 
at the door and examine the house in detail.
Interviewer: What do you mean when you say ‘in detail’?
42  Helga Tawil-Souri, ‘Surveillance Sublime: The Security State in Jerusalem’, Jerusalem Quarterly 68/56-
65 (2016), p. 58.
43  One of the main institutions that enforces surveillance policies is the Israeli National Insurance Insti-
tute (hereafter: NII). The institution dominates the conversations of interviewees, as it is unlikely that 
a Jerusalemite has not been subject to violations of privacy, or has felt unease when the institute’s 
employees pay sudden inspection visits to their houses to check that these are actually occupied.
44  Tawil-Souri, ‘Surveillance Sublime’, p. 60. This matrix includes: ‘Census, population registers, identi-
fication and citizenship requirements and entry permits’.
45  See also Hammoudeh, Hamayel and Welchman, ‘Beyond the Physicality of Space’, pp. 44–5.
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Interviewee: I mean they ask about the baby’s nappies, if they are clean or dirty, about 
the baby’s milk, where the baby sleeps. 
Interviewer: Do they also ask about personal items belonging to your husband in order 
to make sure that he lives with you?
Interviewee: Oh yes, they open the closets to see where his shoes are, where his clothes 
are… they even look for the laundry and check whether we have any hanging laundry 
or in the washing machine…they look at everything…I mean the personal details of the 
daily life of every member of the family…from the most complicated to the most trivial. 
They look and ask in such a provoking manner.
Margins of (Il)legality in Jerusalem
Kufr ʿAqab46 is one of the localities excluded from Jerusalem by the separation wall, but 
considered within of its municipal borders. The liminality of this space is compounded by 
the fact that it is ruled by dual regulatory frameworks, since some parts of Kufr ʿAqab are 
designated as part of Jerusalem’s municipal jurisdiction (although it is located beyond the 
separation wall), while other parts are designated as Area C according to the Oslo Accords. 
It has been governed by a village council since 1996.47
On the ground, this duality results in the absence of an executive and effective local 
authority48 that could be responsible for the management of the residents’ needs. There is 
a severe shortage in municipal services and the infrastructure is poor. The dual municipal 
system has given birth to a state of confusion and disorder and produced a legal vacuum, 
which renders the area a ‘pocket of lawlessness’,49 allowing for different forms of illegali-
ties to thrive – from the spread of drugs to arbitrary construction. The latter is manifested 
in the mushrooming of high-rise buildings as a part of extensive, rapid and informal resi-
dential construction developments.50
The lack of central, local and communal executive authority generated multiple forms 
of random daily practices. These are manifested in the way public institutions, including 
schools and health centres, are established and operated without any substantive govern-
mental supervision. Interviewees indicated that some essential public institutions (like 
schools) emerge in private houses and are run by the private sector without supervision 
or regulation. 
46  There are of course other areas that exist under similar conditions, like Shufat camp and Ras Khamis, 
but we chose to focus on this locality since the majority of the interviewees involved in this project are 
residents of Kufr ʿAqab.
47  Graff, ‘Pockets of Lawlessness in the “Oasis of Justice”’, p. 19.
48  In some interviews, residents mentioned that the PA recently upgraded Kufr ʿAqab to a municipal 
council. However, this council has no real executive effect on the ground. For instance, this council has 
no authority over planning or infrastructure, neither does it have the financial capacity to deal with this.
49  Graff, ‘Pockets of Lawlessness in the “Oasis of Justice”’, pp. 13–29.
50  ‘East Jerusalem Palestinians Localities behind the Barrier’, OCHA / The Monthly Humanitarian Bulletin, 
July 2016.
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Profit-driven private operators have extensive discretion over the employment conditions 
of the teachers, including determining their minimum wages or holiday payments. Inter-
viewees pointed out that at times, these employers apply Israeli employment law (which 
is considered to have higher employment standards), while mostly they apply Palestinian 
law or simply set their own standards. This unregulated discretion is also reflected in 
these operators’ decisions on which curriculum to teach in their institutions; some apply 
the Palestinian curriculum and others select the Israeli, without any clear explanation, as 
some teachers pointed out. 
The accelerated mass immigration of Jerusalem ID holders from areas ‘inside’ the wall to 
Kufr ʿAqab is perceived by some interviewees as the reason behind the inability to create 
a local communal sense of belonging. Among Kufr ʿAqab residents interviewed, whether 
native to the village or not, they acknowledged that living in this locality is marked by a 
sense of multiple crises, which prevents the creation of a commitment to the place and a 
long-term vision for its communal life. They refer to their life in Kufr ʿAqab as temporary 
and suspended, since ‘Israel might at any point declare this area no longer part of Jeru-
salem’. In their eyes, this explains why illegal building is allowed in Kufr ʿAqab and other 
‘outside’ localities, while it is absolutely forbidden ‘inside’ the wall.51
The case of Kufr ʿAqab illustrates living simultaneously with legality and illegality. While 
interviewees referred to Jerusalem ‘inside’ the wall as a place that featured law and order – 
although oppressive – they understood and criticised the illegality(-ies) in Kufr ʿAqab.
Life under the Authority of the ID
The effects of the Jerusalem ID on those living under its authority are hard to catalogue as 
they cover unlimited time and space, and are always extending to new domains in private and 
public everyday spheres of the city. Yet what these interviews emphasise is that this author-
ity has also generated a legal subjectivity that is both vulnerable to and vigilant of its effects, 
practices and intentions. While the effects on everyday life are burdensome and reduce the 
space of active social and political citizenry in Jerusalem, the vigilance and understanding 
of the system residents demonstrate shows that there exist grey areas, between legality and 
subjectivity, that are not as completely dominated by the Jerusalem ID framework as might 
be assumed. Within these grey areas of legality, Jerusalem ID holders act, not merely as 
static subjects of the law, but also as active protectors of this ID and their political and his-
torical rights in holding it. Ironically, through this active attitude, the residents also produce 
and influence the meanings and boundaries of the Jerusalem ID regulatory framework.
51  Graff states in Pockets of Lawlessness, p. 20, that Israel stopped regulating building in these areas since 
the construction of the wall, and ‘the city building inspectors stopped coming and contractors began to 
build large apartment buildings’.
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Conclusion
This project embarked on a set of questions concerning the way regulatory frameworks 
shape the lives of Palestinians at particular sites, including through neoliberal modes of gov-
ernance that have dominated Palestine’s everyday life since Oslo. To respond to this aspect 
of the research, the report identifies several regulatory frameworks, including frameworks 
based on ID status and others concerned with particular groups, like farmers. However, the 
complex reality that these frameworks generate blurs the distinction between them and 
creates discrepancies between legality as a text and legality as an experience. The different 
cases introduced in the report show multi-layered regulatory frameworks that transcend 
particular geographies and space. The report also identifies Palestinian communities that 
live in unregulated spaces, where law and executive authorities are absent and life is left 
bare.
Accordingly, the report does not suggest that the identified regulatory frameworks be the 
sole base upon which to inquire the engagement of Palestinian society with legality. It 
acknowledges that confinement within such regulatory frameworks is a result of the legal 
structure imposed by the Israeli authorities. Therefore, this report invites future inquiry 
into how to define regulatory frameworks in the Palestinian context, in juxtaposition to the 
Israeli legal framing of Palestinian life.
Another aspect of the initial inquiry of this project is concerned with the Palestinian as a 
subject of these regulatory frameworks. Thus, the report has inquired into the forms of Pal-
estinian subjectivities that have emerged out of different regulatory frameworks and how 
Palestinians have perceived, resisted and negotiated them. To respond to such questions 
this report has employed a socio-legal analysis of real-life experiences. This methodology 
and intellectual framing is a deliberate attempt to bring the Palestinian citizen to the fore-
front of the regulatory frameworks.
The overarching argument of the report is that this matrix of regulatory frameworks creates 
the Palestinian as a categorically ‘illegal’ subject, living in a state of constant uncertainty and 
ambiguity. This form of legal subjectivity coercively excludes the Palestinians from their his-
torical, political and social environments, and replaces these environments with dying spaces, 
such as in the case for farmers or in places like Kufr ʿAqab. This report, thus, suggests that 
future social science-based research in the Palestinian context would benefit from further 
studying Palestinians’ engagement with legality, as this sheds light on the actors within Pales-
tinian society who are otherwise ‘outside’ the law.
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